Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 34970 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
6-23-2009
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34970
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34970" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 979.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/979
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY and PRUDENTIAL 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY and 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
and LM PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE, 
VS. 
LESLIE WEINSTEIN and LINDA WEINSTEIN, 
Husband and Wife, individually and as Guardians 
Ad Litem for SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, and 
SARAH R. WEINSTEIN, individually, 
Supreme Court No. 34970 
RESPONDENTSICROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Ada 
Honorable Darla S. Williamson, District Judge, presiding 
Robert A. Anderson 
Phillip J. Collaer 
Mark D. Sebastian 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 S. 5"' Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Attorneys for AppellantsiCross-Respondents 
R. John Insinger (ISB #1678), of Counsel 
Jason S. Risch (ISB #6655) 
RISCH LAW OFFICES, LLC 
407 W. Jefferson St. 
Boise, ID 83702 
R. John Insinger, of Counsel 
GOSS GUSTAVEL GOSS, PLLC 
401 W. Front St., Ste. 302 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Respondents/Cross-Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................... 1 
I . NATURE OF THE CASE ...................... .. ................................................. 1
I1 . COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW .................................................. 2 
I11 . STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................... 2 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL .......................................................................................... 9 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL .............................................................. 10 
I . THE CONTRACT WAS BREACHED, AND APPELLANTS WERE 
OBLIGATED FOR TIMELY PAYMENT OF UM BENEFITS ......................... 10 
I1 . WEINSTEINS PROVED THEIR CASE OF BAD FAITH ................................. 18 
A . Payment delays were indeed intentional and unreasonable ..................... 19 
B . Weinsteins' claims were not "fairly debatable" ....................................... 19 
C . Appellants' "mistakes" were not made in good faith .......................  21 
D . Weinsteins' harm was not fully compensable under contract 
..................................................................................................... damages 22 
1 THERE WAS NO ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTING THE 
............ JURY ON THE UNFAIR CLAIM SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT 24 
IV . THE JURY'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD IS APPROPRIATE AND 
SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED ........................................................................ 25 
A . Idaho's July 1, 2003, punitive damages cap and higher standard of 
................................................................. proof do not apply to this case 26 
B . There was no error in refusing to instruct the jury that Weinsteins had 
.................................................................. to prove corporate ratification 28 
C . The trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the punitive damage 
............... award because of lack of evidence of unconscionable conduct 29 
D . The court did not err in allowing the plaintiffs to amend their 
complaint to state a claim for punitive damages .................................... 30 
E . Punitive damages as awarded and as remitted do not violate due 
................... .............................................................................. process . 31 
V . AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS APPROPRIATE ....................... 37 
VI . THERE WAS NO JUROR MISCONDUCT, AND THEREFORE NO 
............................................... ERROR IN NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL 38 
VII . THERE WAS NO ERROR NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
OF ANNOTATED EXHIBIT LISTS PROVIDED TO THE JURY ................... 40 
VIII . WEINSTEINS' DAMAGES WERE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND NOT EXCESSIVE ................................................................................... 40 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 41 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................... 41 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
AID Ins . Co . v . !mnstron~.  1 19 Idaho 897. 900. 8 1 1 P.2d 507. 5 10 (Ct . App . 199 1) ................ 13 
American Foreign Ins . Co . v . Reichert. 140 Idaho 394. 94 P.3d 699 (2004) ............................... 12 
Anderson v . Farmers Ins . Co . of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755, 947 P.2d 1003 (1997) .................... 11, 12 
BMW of N . Am., Inc . v . Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S . Ct . 1589, 134 L . Ed . 2d 809 
(1996) ......................................................................................................................... 31, 33, 35 
Bondv v . Lew. 121 Idaho 993, 829 P.2d 1342 (1992) ............................................................... 13 
Brinkman v . Aid Ins . Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988) ................................... 14, 21. 38 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc . v . Idaho Farm Bureau Ins . Co., 141 Idaho 660, 115 P.3d 751 
(2005) ...................................................................................................................................... 13
Chester v . State Farm Ins . Co., 117 Idaho 538, 789 P.2d 534 (Ct . App . 1990) ............. 13, passim 
Cook v . Skyline Corn., 135 Idaho 26, 13 P.3d 857 (2000) ......................................................... 26 
Corbridrze v . Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 730 P.2d 1005 (1986) .................................. 27 
Exxon Shipping Co . v . Baker, 554 U.S. -$ 128 S . Ct . 2605, 171 L . Ed . 2d 570 (2008) ........ 36 
Greenounh v . Farm Bureau Mut . Ins . Co . of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006) ........ 12 
Hall v . Farmers Alliance Mut . Ins . Co., 145 Idaho 313, 179 P.3d 276 (2008) .............. 31, passim 
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v . Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991) .................. 27 
Inland Group of Companies. Inc . v . Providence Washinaon Ins . Co., 133 Idaho 249, 985 
P.2d 674 (1999) ....................................................................................................... 13, passim 
Levinner v . Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 75 P.3d 1202 (2003) ................................. 38 
Manning v . Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp.. Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 (1992) .................... 29 
Martin v . State Farm Mut . Ins.. 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002) ..................................... 14, 15 
Mason v . State Farm Mut . Auto . Ins . Co.,145 Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944 (2007) ......................... 13 
McCabe v . Craven, 145 Idaho 954 (Ct . App . 2007) .................................................................... 28 
McDonough Power Equipment. Inc . v . Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 104 S . Ct . 845, 78 
L . Ed . 2d 663 (1984) ........................................................................................................ 38, 39 
Myers v . Workmen's Auto . Ins . Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004) .................... 31, passim 
Parsons v . Mutual of Enumclaw Ins . Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007) ................... 37, 38 
Robinson v . State Farm Mut . Auto . Ins . Co., 137 Idaho 173, 45 P.3d 829 (2002) ...................... 22 
Ryals v . State Farm Auto . Ins . Co., 134 Idaho 302, 1 P.3d 803 (2000) ..................................... 17 
StateFarmMut . Auto . Ins . Co . v . Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S . Ct., 1513, 155 L . Ed . 2d 
585 (2003) .............................................................................................................. 25, passim 
State v . Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88, 936 P.2d 1330 (Ct . App . 1997) ............................................ 38, 39 
State v . Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 828 P.2d I304 (1992) ............................... ......... .............. 38, 39 
Uidur v . Thompson, 126 Idaho 6, 878 P.2d 180 (1994) .............................................................. 12 
Vendelin v . Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 95 P.3d 34 (2004) ....................... 26, 29, 30 
Walston v . Monumental Life Ins . Co., 129 Idaho 21 1, 923 P.2d 456 (1996) .............................. 24 
Western Corn . v . Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 158 P.3d 313 (Ct . App . 2006) ................................. 27 
White v . Unigard Mut . Ins . Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986) ...................... 11, 12, 14, 24 
Williams v . Phillip Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S . Ct . 1057, 166 L . Ed . 2d 940 
(2007) .................................... .... ............................................................................. 3 1, 32. 37 
- ii - 
RULES 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l) ............................................................................................................................. 26 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code 9 6-1604 .............................................................................................................. 26, 28 
Idaho Code 9 41-1329 ..................................................................................................... 14, 15, 24 
Idaho Code 5 41-1839 .......................... . ................................................................................ 37 
Idaho Sess . Laws ch . 122, sec . 2, sec . 6 ............................. 26 
OTHER 
Allan D . Windt. Insurance Claims and Disputes: Representation of Insurance Companies 
and Insureds. 9 6:40 (2007) .................................................................................................. 24 
th Black's Law Dictionary. Revised (6 ed.) ................................................................................... 13 
Supreme Court of the United States Opinion No . 07-219 ....................................................... 36 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Leslie and Linda Weinstein ("Weinsteins") purchased an automobile policy ("Policy") from 
Appellant Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("Prudential") which in part 
provided uninsured motorist ("UM) limits of $250,000.00 less medical payments ("Med Pay" or 
"MP") paid up to $5,000.00 per person. Weinsteins were insured by Prudential for many years and 
continued to pay their monthly premiums during the entire time their claim was unpaid. 
On September 30,2002, the Weinsteins' then minor daughter Sarah Weinstein ("Sarah'') was 
seriously injured when an uninsured motorist caused a collision with the insured car driven by 
Linda. The next day Prudential determined the accident was entirely the fault ofan uninsured driver 
and opened a UM claim file. Prudential then requested (and Lindaprovided) an Authorization and 
Release of All Medical Information relative to Sarah and Linda. For nearly two years after the 
accident, the Appellants (Liberty Mutual purchased Prudential in November 2003) did nothing to 
secure medical information to evaluate the claim, or pay any UM benefits coverage despite knowing 
that Weinsteins had incurred substantial medical expenses for Sarah's injuries. Beginning in January 
2003, the Weinsteins repeatedly requested the Appellants to pay the outstanding medical bills, and 
made Appellants aware of their perilous financial situation and creditor problems because of unpaid 
medical bills. Some seven months after the accident (by which time Weinsteins had often been 
harassed by the medical providers and bill collectors for not paying) Appellants finally paid only a 
minimal amount on medical bills, only under the Med Pay coverage. Nearly a year after the accident 
more bills were paid (exhausting Med Pay benefits), but Appellants refiised to pay the remaining 
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bills even though $245,000.00 of undisputed UM coverage was available (Appellants never disputed 
any of the bills or was solely attributable to an uninsured motorist). 
Appellants' company policy was to wait and pay UM benefits only in one final payment at 
the end of an insured's recovery, and only when their insured was ready to settle the entire claim. 
Implementing that company policy, Appellants refused to pay Weinsteins any partial or interim UM 
benefits even though Appellants valued Sarah's UM claim as high as $150,000.00. 
11. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Weinsteins concur that the statement of the Course of the Proceedings set forth in Appellants' 
Brief is accurate, except for the use of "alleged" referring to Sarah's injury in line 10 thereof. 
111. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In their Brief the Appellants have once again presented a masterful spin of selected but 
incomplete facts advancing a tale which readers without knowledge of the entire story could 
conclude is quite plausible, and thus find no fault with the Appellants' conduct handling Weinsteins' 
first-party UM insurance claim. The Appellants presented and argued essentially this same factual 
spin to the juty and again to Judge Williamson in post-trial motions, but their story was rejected in 
both instances. When the entire pertinent factual scenario of this case is considered by this Court, 
the result of this appeal should be the same result as the jury verdict and (except for the remittitur of 
punitive damages) affirming Judge Williamson's decisions on Appellants' post-trial motions. 
The more complete factual scenario of this case is as follows: 
On septLmber 30, 2002, Sarah was a passenger in the Weinstein vehicle covered by the 
Policy issued by Prudential. The Policy included Med Pay benefits of $5,000.00 and $250,000.00 
(less up to $5,000.00 of Med Pay benefits paid) of UM coverage. The next day Prudential and its 
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UM department opened a UM claim file and determined an uninsured driver was 100% at fault for 
the collision. Ex. 46. Appellants' UM liability was never disputed thereafter. 
By December 5, 2002, the Weinsteins provided the release and authorization of medical 
information on the form Prudential provided, with a list of medical providers. Ex. 61,63. Medical 
bills were received either from Weinsteins or directly from the providers, but Prudential steadfastly 
refused payment, incorrectly asserting to Weinsteins and the providers that a Coordination of 
Benefits ("COB") provision of the policy required that Weinsteins first submit their medical bills to 
their health insurance carrier before payment would be made by their auto insurance (Ex. 55-58,62, 
65, 66, 68) some six months after the accident Prudential acknowledged its COB mistake. 
Appellants never used the first medical release/authorization, never made any inquiries of any of the 
medical providers, and never otherwise investigated any of the medical expenses or records available 
with that authorization. A year after the accident Weinsteins provided second, and then third 
authorizations and provider lists required by Appellants' UM department. Ex. 78-81, 103. 
Appellants never used any of the three authorizations or lists to obtain bills or records. 
More than three months after the accident, in January 2003, Linda called Prudential's UM 
adjuster at least twice, upset because she was receiving threatening messages from the unpaid 
medical providers and advising that Sarah was still being treated for her injuries. Ex. 64,67. Only 
three weeks later, Appellants told the Weinsteins that their Med Pay claim file would be closed if 
new medical bills were not received "within 30 days." Ex. 70. Only twelve days later Appellants' 
closed the Weinsteins' Med Pay claim file as threatened. Ex. 71. 
Sarah's post-accident treatment included physician-prescribed physical therapy. By February 
2003 she was released to participate in physical activities to the extent her pain tolerance allowed, so 
Sarah returned to playing soccer (her passion), but on a limited basis. R. Vol. If, p. 289. Soon her 
pain forced her to stop playing altogether and she sought further medical attention. R. Vol. II, p. 289. 
After her May 19,2003, surgery, Sarah again engaged in physical therapy, but her improvement was 
difficult and slow, and required ongoing medical provider assessment. During that recovery time, 
Sarah appeared to friends and family to be withdrawn and depressed, and she suffered constant pain 
and discomfort, and missed a lot of school. R. Vol. 11, p. 290. Eventually Sarah returned to playing 
soccer, but was very limited because of continuing pain. Sarah still suffers pain when she engages in 
sports or heavy physical activity. R. Vol. 11, p. 290. Medical doctors, including the Appellants' own 
physician expert, testified that Sarah will probably require future surgery and most likely develop 
arthritis in her injured hip area. R. Vol. 11, p. 290. 
On April 3,2003, Linda called and spoke with a UM supervisor, advising him that new MRI 
tests indicated that Sarah might require surgery, whereupon he revalued the claim at $25,000.00. 
Ex. 73. Linda again called Appellants' UM adjuster on May 12, 2003, advising that based on a 
second MRI, Sarah was scheduled for hip surgery on May 19,2003, with an expected recovery time 
of six to nine months, and that "the bills are running up." Ex. 75. About that time, Appellants had 
paid only $52.22 on the claim. Ex. 72. 
Weinsteins (primarily Linda) continued to receive near daily phone calls and letters froin 
medical provider billing departments and collection agencies demanding payment of the overdue 
medical bills. R. Vol. 11, p. 290. One of Sarah's doctor's staff informed Linda in front of other staff, 
Sarah and other waiting room patients that if the Weinsteins did not immediately pay the outstanding 
bill in full Sarah would receive no further treatment. R. Vol. 11, p. 290. Those events brought Linda 
to tears, made her depressed and caused her grief, stress, and embarrassment. Those events also 
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brought on turmoil in the family and discord between Leslie and Linda. R. Vol. 11, p. 290. Linda 
repeatedly called and complained about the outstanding bills and finally on July 31, 2003, some 
overdue bills were paid under Med Pay coverage, but only to the extent that Med Pay limits were 
exhausted. Ex. 77,78. Many bills remainedunpaid despite $245,000.00 of remaining UM coverage. 
Appellants paid no UM benefits until after suit was filed. 
In September 2003, Linda called again and angrily demanded that the UM adjuster pay all the 
medical bills (many of which by that time were with collection agencies) and repeated her fears that 
Sarah would not receive ongoing medical treatment from unpaid providers. R. Vol. 11, pp. 290-91. 
'The UM adjuster's response was to tell Linda that even though the Med Pay coverage was exhausted, 
the UM coverage would not pay anvthing until all of Sarah's treatment was ended and Weinsteins 
would agree to a final settlement of the entire claim. Ex. 78. At the same time, Appellants requested 
a second authorization and provider list, purportedly to secure all of Sarah's medical information and 
records from its own Med Pay file (Ex. 72,78), even though the UM adjuster already had access to 
the Med Pay file. Tr. pp. 500, 501 (D. Quinn Testimony). 
Linda provided the second signed release the same day it was requested. Ex. 79-81. After 
that, Appellants continued to refuse paying the remaining bills, even falsely stating to multiple 
unpaid medical providers that the Weinsteins' "policy benefits have been exhausted" (Ex. 83, 84, 
11 I ,  113, 119), whereas in truth up to $245,000.00 of undisputed UM benefits remained under the 
Policy. 
Weinsteins then secured the services of Boise attorney Bruce Bistline ("Bistline"), who on 
October 10,2003, notified the Appellants of his representation. Ex. 89. The Appellants' requested 
that Bistline provide "complete medical and wage loss documentation." Ex. 94. Two weeks later, 
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Bistline wrote and asked whether the Appellants disputed UM liability, and demanded payment of 
several still outstanding medical bills under the UM coverage. Ex. 100-105. Appellants increased 
Sarah's claim value to $50,000.00 (Ex. 97-99), but did not respond to Bistline's letter. 
Appellant Liberty Mutual purchased Prudential and became responsible for handling "all 
matters in the complaint." (Answer 7 2.) 
On November 3, 2003, Bistline again demanded payment of Sarah's outstanding medical 
bills; Appellants told Bistline they "did not know what was wrong with Sarah" and they required 
another (w) medical authorization. Ex. 106. Even though Linda had previously executed and 
provided two separate medical authorization forms and list of medical providers the Appellants told 
Bistline their further investigation was conditioned on (a) receiving another list of medical providers 
providing yet another (third) medical authorization form, and (b) Bistline providing them copies of 
all medical reports and expenses (Ex. 106) (which Appellants themselves could have long before 
secured using either of the two earlier authorizations and provider lists). Bistline agreed to gather 
current bills on the condition that the Appellants provide him their own Med Pay claim file. 
Ex. 1 14-1 6. More than four more months passed until the Appellants finally provided Bistline only a 
brief summary of their Med Pay file log, without any supporting documents. Ex. 123-25. 
After Bistline's October 28,2003, demand for payment of all remaining unpaid medical bills 
under the UM coverage (Ex. 106), the UM adjuster, her supervisor, and the Claim Unit Manager 
conferred. They again acknowledged full UM liability, and the UM claim adjuster was directed to 
consult with an in-house attorney regarding Bistline's demand for payment of the medical bills. 
Ex. 108. The in-house attorney advised the adjuster that he was not aware of any Idaho law that 
required payment of any medical bills before a final settlement. Ex. 11 0. Appellants continued with 
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the conscious decision to follow company policy and pay nothing (not even undisputed amounts) 
under the UM coverage until "the end" when Weinsteins were ready to make a final settlement ofthe 
entire claim. 
Bistline sent Appellants another letter on April 20, 2004, demanding payment for all 
outstanding medical bills. Ex. 128. A month later, Bistline provided Appellants copies of Sarah's 
medical records (which had been available to Appellants more than a year earlier had they used the 
medical authorizations they acquired from Linda). Ex. 255-259. Appellants then increased the claim 
value to $75,000.00 on June 7,2004. Ex. 260. 
Appellants' new UM adjuster began the first actual evaluation of Sarah's medical records on 
June 9,2004 (Ex. 262), but not by using any of the three authorizations secured from Linda as early 
as December 2002. Even by that time Appellants' UM department had not yet obtained or reviewed 
the medical records from its Med Pay file. UM adjusters secured an authorization directly from 
Linda a year and a half earlier and then made at least three written directives to its Med Pay 
department over nine months to transmit Sarah's Med Pay claim file to the UM adjuster. Ex. 264, 
82, 1 18, 127. As noted earlier, the UM adjuster had her own access to the Med Pay file. Appellants 
still argue their delay in evaluating Sarah's UM claim was the result of delays by Bistline providing 
them records. 
Despite Appellants' acknowledged corporate policy and practice was to make no partial 
or advanced payments (even of undisputed amounts) until its first-party insureds' were ready to agree 
to a final settlement of the entire claim, the UM adjuster, her supervisor and the Unit manager finally 
wavered. On June 10,2004, they came up with a "plan" to offer Weinsteins an "advance payment" 
of $1 0,000.00 because they recognized Weinsteins may have some "out of pocket expenses," but still 
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denying any legal obligation to pay. Ex. 267-69. Accepting that $10,000.00 tender, however, 
required Weinsteins to sign a partial release ("Payment in Advance Agreement") which conditioned 
the $10,000.00 payment on Weinsteins agreeing that Appellants would reserve all rights and 
defenses with respect to Sarah's UM claim, even though Appellants continued to acknowledge full 
UM liability. Ex. 268-70. The Policy's UM coverage specified that the Appellants were only 
obligated to pay "the amount that an insured is le~allv entitled to recover for bodily injury but could 
not collect from the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.) 
R. Vol. 11, p. 187, Ex. 10000-27. At the same meeting, the handling adjuster and Claim Unit 
Manager recommended that Sarah's claim be value reserved at $150,000.00. Ex. 267-69. 
Bistline's July 7,2004, responsive letter rejected the tender, in part due to his concerns about 
the pending statute of limitations, and advised that suit had been filed. Ex. 272-73. 
Only after being sued Appellants first began to pay under UM coverage. In piecemeal 
fashion, Appellants soon paid all of Sarah's medical bills. Ex. 275-76,282. On January 10,2005, 
Appellants also paid another $80,000.00 ($60,000.00 for Sarah's general damages). Ex. 283-84. 
At trial, Appellants repeatedly justified their refksal to pay any UM benefits before this suit 
was filed because their corporate policy on UM claims was to wait and withhold any UM claim 
evaluation and benefit payment until the insured's treatment had ended, and only then would they 
gather all information and evaluate the UM claim. That policy applied even as any undisputed 
portions of its first-party insureds UM claims. Appellants' entire defense theory was founded on 
following that policy. Their own primary adjuster testified that Weinsteins' claim was handled in 
complete conformance with company policy, and their claim logs confirm that the UM claim 
supervisors determined that Sarah's claim was properly directed. Ex. 112, Tr. 512. 
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Appellants' own had faith trial expert testified that payment of UM undisputed amounts in 
advance of one final payment was unheard of in Idaho, hut acknowledged that if at "the end" a UM 
insured was not satisfied with the final settlement offer the insureds' only recourse would be to file 
suit. Tr. pp. 663, 629, 636 (Paul Testimony). In rebuttal, three practicing attorneys (John Janis, 
Andrew Chasan and Kurt Holzer) testified that the common Idaho industry practice of insurers is to 
pay undisputed UM benefits in advance of a final settlement. R. Vol. 11, p. 3 14. 
Appellants' UM evaluation and payment policy of only one lump sum at "the end" was 
contrary to Appellants' own claims handling training materials. In part, those materials stated that 
both "failure to make an offer when there is no demand," and "delay in the evaluation and handling 
of UM claims and withholding payment of undisputed portions in states where the law required such 
payment before final settlement" were evidence of bad faith and that claim investigations should 
commence upon receipt of a& of claim. (Emphasis added.) Ex. 4000, pp. 7, 14. 
Trial evidence showed that the Appellants' net worth was $7.9 billion, with a 2005 net 
income of $584 million. R. Vol. 11, p. 303. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in reducing the jury's $6 million punitive damage award to 
$1.89 million? 
2. Did the District Court e n  in ordering a remittitur reducing the punitive damage award 
from $6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying the Defendants'IAppellants' Motion for 
New Trial? 
3. Did the District Court err in granting the Defendants'/Appellants' Motion for New 
Trial as to punitive damages should PlaintiffsIRespondents refuse to accept the remittitur of the 
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punitive damages award from $6 million to $1.89 million as a condition of denying the Motion for 
New Trial? 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL 
Because Weinsteins' Cross-Appeal issues stated immediately above overlap and directly 
relate to most of the issues raised in Appellants' Appeal, the arguments below address both 
Appellants' Appeal and Weinsteins' Cross-Appeal. 
In the balance of this Brief, Weinsteins' use the terms "company practice'' or "company 
policy." When either any of these terms are used herein, they mean and refer to Appellants' 
fundamental trial defense that their UM adjusters always handled Weinsteins' claim in 
accordance with Appellants' standard policy andlor practice of knowingly and intentionally 
refusing to pay any UM benefits other than by a single payment at "the end'' when its first- 
party UM insured was willing to settle the entire claim, notwithstanding the passage of time, or 
if any portions of the UM claim were not in dispute. 
I. THE CONTRACT WAS BREACHED, AND APPELLANTS WERE 
OBLIGATED FOR TIMELY PAYMENT OF UM BEh'EFITS. 
Under both the contract and the independent duty, Appellants were obligated to pay the 
claims within a reasonable time after submitted. Their failure was bad faith. 
The Appellants continue to assert that when a UM claim is submitted (be it a medical bill or 
any other claim in a first-party situation) they have a right to either do nothing or create and 
implement their own internal claim procedures without regard to their contract or Idaho law, even 
though that company practice results in the intentional delay of payment of undisputed portions of a 
UM claim and violate their own adjuster training materials. 
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UM coverage is first-party coverage, and UM claims are first-party claims, as Appellants 
themselves acknowledge in their own claims manuals. Ex. 3000, p. 46. 
In White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., I12 Idaho 94,730 P.2d 1014 (1986) ("Mite"), this Court 
first recognized first-party insurance bad faith, stating: 
Accordingly we hold that there exists a common law tort action, distinct from an 
action on the contract, for an insurer's bad faith in settling the first-party claims of its 
insured. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 100. 
-
Appellants stubbornly rekse to acknowledge that White applied to 4 first-party claims. 
White did not include or except any specific types of first-party coverage or claims from the tort of 
bad faith. Rather, in explicit detail, While determined that the relations hi^ between the insured and 
the insurer in a first-party situation is the fundamental basis of the tort of bad faith in first-party 
cases. m, supra at 100. A UM case is merely one type of first-party coverage where that special 
relationship exists. 
Common to all first-party insurance is the consumers making conscious financial decisions to 
put their money, trust and confidence directly in their insurer's hands, and relying on the insurer to 
be there to help and protect them if a catastrophe occurs. The insurer in turn accepts the premiums 
and agrees to provide that protection. 
Appellants' contend bad faith in the UM context is an "issue of first impression" in Idaho. 
That is wrong. This Court established that bad faith applies to UM cases, in Anderson v. Fanners 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755,947 P.2d 1003 (1997) ("Anderson"). In Anderson, brought under 
UM coverage, the court held: 
In order to recover on her bad faith claim Anderson must show: (1) the insurer 
intentionally and unreasonably denied or withheld payment, (2) the claim was not 
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fairly debatable, (3) the denial or failure to pay was not the result of a good faith 
mistake, and (4) the resulting harm is not kl ly compensable by contract damages. 
Id. at 759. 
-
The Anderson court specifically cited White for an insured to pursue a bad faith claim for 
intentionally and unreasonably denying or withholding benefits in a UM case in Anderson (the 
insured's claim was determined to be fairly debatable on its merits so the plaintiff therein did not 
prevail on her bad faith claim). More recently, application of bad faith to UM cases was confirmed 
in American Foreign Ins. Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394,94 P.3d 699 (2004) ("Reichert"). Despite 
Anderson and Reichert, Appellants steadfastly argue that their payment obligations under UM is "an 
issue of first impression" constituting a legal "fair debate." 
The heart of any bad faith is the first element, intentionally and unreasonably denying or 
withholding payment. Appellants insist that under the Policy (and following their company policy) 
they are legally entitled to intentionally withhold UM payment until a single payment "at the 
end," even if they do not dispute portions of the claim. Appellants argue that because "payment" and 
"amount" in the Policy are singular, Appellants are contractually obligated to make only 
payment, at the end when their insured will agree to settle the entire claim. The PoIicy says, "our 
pavment is based on the amount that an insured is legally entitled to recover for bodily injuty but 
could not collect from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." (Emphasis added.) 
Money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract. 
Greenoughv. FarmBureauMut. Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 142 Idaho 589,593,130P.3d 1127 (2006). Ifno 
time for payment is specified, payment must be made in a reasonable time. Uidur v. Thompson, 126 
Idaho 6, 9, 878 P.2d 180, 183 (1 994). Here, Appellants' position on the meaning of the Policy 
language effectively tries to assert an ambiguity. If an ambiguity exists, the jury must determine 
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"what a reasonable person would have understood the language to mean." Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 
993,997,829 P.2d 1342,1346 (1 992). Because insurance contracts are adhesionary, any ambiguities 
must be construed most strongly against the insurer. Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 
Idaho 197,177 P.3d 944 (2007). 
In fact there is no ambiguity in this case, and therefore the terms in the insurance contract are 
given their plain meaning. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc, v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 
662-63, 1 15 P.3d 75 I ,  753-54 (2005). Common words are given the meaning applied by laymen in 
daily usage rather than the meaning derived from some legal usage. AID Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 11 9 
Idaho 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1991). The plain meaning of the Policy words 
"payment," "amount" and "based on the amount" specify how the total claim amount will be paid, 
not -payment is due or whether it will be paid in portions or only later in one single payment. 
"Amount" is an aggregate or total of items and "amount to" as "to reach in the aggregate. . . 
or reach by an accumulation of particular sums or quantities." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 
(6th ed.). The clear meaning of "amount" is a total or aggregate sum of multiple components. Here, 
the "particular sums" of Weinsteins' claim included undisputed medical bills. "Payment" does not 
strictly define a one-time event; "payment" is ". . . performance of an agreement," and encompasses 
"=t payment." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised (6" ed.). Further, the Policy language states that 
payment was only "w' on the amount rather than the amount due. It is also noteworthy 
that Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249,985 P.2d 
674 (1999) uses the singular context of "payment," in a first-party case requiring the insurer to pay 
undisputed amounts in advance: "[tlhe ultimate question to be answered in any bad faith claim is 
whether the insurer 'intentionally and unreasonably denie[d] or delay[ed] payment' . . . ." Id. at 255. 
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The jury had ample facts and argument from both sides on the meaning and effect of 
"payment" and "amount," and determined in Weinsteins' favor. Likewise, in post-trial motions the 
trial court found in Weinsteins' favor. R. Vol. 11, p. 334. 
A proof of loss is information the insured provides proportional to that reasonably available 
to the insured, sufficient to allow the insurer areasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its 
liability, and the insurer is then obligated to investigate and/or determine its rights and liabilities. 
Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346,349-50,766 P.2d 1227,1230-31 (1988). Applying Idaho 
Code $ 41-1329, an insurer in a first-party claim has the duty to investigate a claim promptly and 
without reasonable delay and tender the amount justly due within 30 days. Martin v. State Farm 
Mut. Ins., 138 Idaho 244,248,61 P.3d 601 (2002) ("Martin") and m, supra. 
Even in the absence of Martin and Idaho Code $ 41-1329, after submitting specific covered 
medical bills not disputed after a reasonable time, no UM policyholder would reasonably expect to 
have to wait for years until their insurer (in its own financial interest) finally decides when to offer 
only one payment at the end. Here, the medical authorizations and other information Appellants 
made each of the Weinsteins' medical bills (none of which were ever disputed) a sufficient proof of 
loss and an "amount" due and payable, and triggered the duty to investigate and pay. 
Like Inland, Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 538,789 P.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1990) 
also address the law in first-party had faith cases concerning insurers withholding payment under 
first-party coverage when a portion of the claim is not fairly debatable, and what constitutes an 
unreasonable and intentional delay by withholding benefits. The insurer must pay the undisputed 
portion of a claim even if it legitimately disputes any other part of the claim. w, 133 Idaho at 
256, Chester, 117 Idaho at 541. Appellants simply ignore and reject all the authority, arguing 
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that even though inland, Chester and Martin address first-party claims, they do not apply to UM 
claims. 
None of Weinsteins' medical bills were ever disputed in any way. Tr. pp. 493-94. UM 
liability was never disputed. Mow Appellants finally paid after being sued (piecemeal) demonstrates 
that Appellants knew the law required them to pay undisputed portions when due. Once sued, 
Appellants' payments were dictated by the law rather than their company policy and their own 
financial interest. 
The most compelling reason to reject the Appellants' company policy is the complete 
absence of any legitimate reason for them to withhold payment. Once undisputed, those portions of 
the UM benefits belonged to the Weinsteins. In early 2003, Appellants knew Weinsteins' financial 
and emotional hardships and that Sarah's injuries were serious ($25,000.00 claim value assigned 
April 4,2003). Even so, they steadfastly refused to pay anflhing simply because company policy 
served their own financial interest by holding on to Weinsteins' money and oppressing their 
vulnerable insureds. Such tactics are unlawful and in direct violation of the insurance industry 
standards in Idaho's Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act (Idaho Code 4 41 -1 329). See Mavtin and 
inland. Weinsteins paid and contracted to be protected from uninsured drivers if and when such 
catastrophe happened. They did not contract for a fight. 
Nearly two years after the accident (June 11,2004) Appellants finally considered deviating 
from company practice. In doing the "unprecedented," the handling adjuster, her supervisor, and the 
Unit Manager devised (in their words) aL'plan" (Tr. pp. 471-72) for Weinsteins' claim. This "plan" 
was to dangle a $10,000.00 "advance payment" carrot in front of the Weinsteins, hoping they would 
be appeased. However, to get that fraction of their undisputed $150,000.00 claim, Weinsteins would 
be required to sign a partial release, reserving ijl legal defenses to Appellants. The statute of 
limitations would soon expire on Sarah's claim against the uninsured motorist (on September 30, 
2004). 
Although the trial court did not ultimately view this plan the same as Weinsteins, she 
acknowledged their argument to the jury was "well-founded." R. Vol. 11, p. 3 10. Weinsteins believe 
and urge that, particularly given Appellants' tenacity on strict interpretation of "payment" and 
"amount" in the Policy, Appellants realized that if Weinsteins did not file suit by September 30, 
2004, they would no longer be "legally entitled" to recover anything from the uninsured driver and 
thus be barred from further recovery under the Policy language. UM liability was not an issue for 
two years after the accident, but by the release it would become an absolute claim defense if 
Weinsteins did not file suit against the uninsured tortfeasor before September 30,2004. Appellants 
testified this offer was a "unique" and unprecedented action, but under cross-examination the 
adjuster admitted she had used the same form "numerous times before" and that "no attorney ever 
refused to sign it." Tr. pp. 471-72,5 12. In any event, when "strings" come with an agreement to pay 
an undisputed amount, it is bad faith. Chester, 117 Idaho at 541. 
Appellants' "plan" was not some magnanimous gesture showing Appellants' concern and 
good faith in trying to help Weinsteins in their financial crisis. They admit having used this tactic 
often. The $10,000.00 offer was simply additional bad faith. As early as January 2003, Appellants 
knew the unpaid bills were causing financial hardship and distress, and later that some bills had gone 
into collection. Even without a defense reservation agreement, by taking the $10,000.00 Weinsteins 
could easily have fallen into a false sense of security that their claim was finally under review with 
an eye on final settlement, letting the statute of limitations expire. Ifthat had happened, Appellants 
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would have purchased the entire Weinstein claim for a mere $10,000.00. It is also conceivable that 
Weinsteins could have believed that finally seeing some money was a light at the end of the nearly 
two-year tunnel, and in their anxiety and eagerness might be "softened up" at the end to settle for less 
just to resolve the claim. 
Fortunately, Appellants' plan did not work this time. Declining the advance payment, 
Weinsteins advised that they had filed suit for breach of contract (stating in part their concerns about 
the statute of limitations) and bad faith. Appellants argue that Weinsteins over-reacted by filing 
suit. Rather, Weinsteins had little choice, so they drew the gun and took aim. 
Only after they were sued did Appellants finally pay all the bills (without any dispute or 
objection) in a piecemeal fashion, showing their knowledge that company policy was wrong and that 
a jury would be judging their conduct. Even though Sarah's claim was internally valued as high as 
$150,000.00 before suit, six or seven months after suit was filed Appellants paid only $80,000.00 of 
Sarah's general damages. Their adjuster admitted that the post-suit UM piecemeal payment was 
based on the same information available to Appellants before their $10,000.00 advance payment 
"plan" (Tr. p. 478); they simply could have used any of t h e m  separate authorizations dating back 
to December 2002. Such multiple requests and a long process purporting to gather information are 
viewed as a "starve out" tactic for delay. Chester, 117 Idaho at 541. 
Appellants' corporate policy does not, as claimed, meet "the purpose of Idaho's uninsured 
motorist statute [is] to afford the protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as 
would have been enjoyed had the tortfeasor carried liability insurance" under Rvals v. State Farm 
Auto. Ins. Co., 134 Idaho 302,307, 1 P.3d 803 (2000). That argument incorrectly focuses on the 
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word "same" in a completely different no-fault insurance conflict of laws situation. In a UM case, 
the word to focus on is "protection" of the first-party insured. 
Appellants also try to compare Weinsteins' first-party UM status to a hypothetical situation 
wherein Weinsteins were third-party claimants under a liability policy of a tortfeasor with liability 
insurance. Appellants' obvious analogy and failure to differentiate the treatment of first-party and 
third-party claims and the respective duties conclusively shows Appellants' degree of bad faith in 
this action. They concede their company policy is a conscious decision to handle Weinsteins' claim, 
like all their UM claims, as if dealing with third parties. 
Appellants' company policy also assures that once their insured submits a claim under UM 
coverage Appellants simply "step into the shoes of the tortfeasor" and unilaterally convert their 
insured's first-party claim to a third-party claim. Doing so, Appellants become adversarial to their 
own first-party insured, who have paid money to be protected, rather than see their insurer as an 
adversary. UM premiums are paid for protection, not to buy a lawsuit. This "stepping into the shoes 
of the third-party tortfeasor" argument is shameful, showing their actual intent is to maintain an 
adversarial relationship with their UM insureds. 
Weinsteins did not argue for, nor did the court impose, any "new terms" into Appellants' 
insurance contract. The juty was instructed to interpret the contract in full accordance with the law 
and there was no error. Appellants clearly breached their contract, and they committed bad faith. 
11. WERVSTEINS PROVED THEIR CASE OF BAD FAITH 
The Weinsteins presented far more than a mere prima facie bad faith case, shown by the jury 
verdict and acknowledged in the trial court's Decision and Order on Defindants' Motion for 
Rernitfitur or, in the Alternative New Trial. R. Vol. 11, p. 313. 
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The facts show Appellants unreasonably denied or withheld payment: 
1. The day after the accident Appellants opened a UM claim file and 
acknowledged UM liability, and soon thereafter secured medical release 
authorizations and list of providers from Linda, and valued the claim; 
2. During the year after the accident Linda kept Appellants' UM department 
apprised of Sarah's ongoing treatment and injuries, Weinsteins' hardships 
from the bills not being paid, and she continued to demand payment; 
3. Appellants' UM file reviews for nearly two years after the accident 
continually acknowledged full UM liability and the seriousness of 
Weinsteins' claim (internal valuations as high as $150,000.00); 
4. As requested, Weinsteins provided UM personnel three separate Appellant- 
required medical authorizations and provider lists in fourteen months after 
the accident, but Appellants used any of those authorizations; 
5. Appellants waited nearly twenty (20) months after the accident before 
undertaking any evaluation or investigation aimed at eventual payment or 
settlement; 
6.  Appellants' UM adjusters never secured Weinsteins' medical records from 
their own UM department, despite three directives over a nine-month 
period; and 
7. Appellants' UM claim company policy was made clear. 
A. Payment delays were indeed intentional and unreasonable. 
Given the facts, the delays cannot be justified. Appellants' company policy existed for 
the sake of delay to financially benefit Appellants. Appellants' own witnesses testified that the 
handling of Weinsteins' claim was in accordance with established company policy. Tr. p. 512. 
B. Weinsteins' claims were not "fairly debatable." 
Appellants argue four separate areas of alleged "fair debate." All are groundless. First, they 
assert that any obligation to pay any undisputed amount prior to a single evaluation and payment at 
the end is a "legal question of first impression." That position again ignores the law set forth in 
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Inland and Chestev. Rather than following the law (and more fundamentally doing what was simply 
fair and right for their insureds), Appellants steadfastly hold to their twisted interpretation of 
"payment" and "amount," and their company practice. Even more unbelievable is Appellants' 
criticism of Mr. Bistline for not providing them the legal authority for the obligation to pay 
undisputed amounts when due. Appellants' approach to this entire case is to blame Weinsteins, 
Bistline, and anyone and anything else for the delays rightfully attributable to Appellants only. 
Appellants even disregard their own claims manuals which warned not to delay or withhold payment 
of undisputed claim portions in those states where required. 
Appellants' second argument of a "fair debate" is that factually "a question arose" if Sarah 
reinjured or aggravated her hip by playing soccer. That position was concocted for trial: 
1. Appellants never reviewed Sarah's medical records until May 2004; 
2. Appellants only reviewed the records Mr. Bistline provided, rather than 
themselves acquiring the records using any of the medical authorizations 
they had previously required and secured; 
3. This "question" was never expressed to Weinsteins or Bistline, appearing in 
one brief note in the reviewing adjuster's file in May 2004, and was never 
subject of any further claim evaluation, or in any payment documents after 
suit was filed; and 
4. Even though Appellants now argue that Sarah's treating physician testified 
that damage "could have occurred" to Sarah's hip before the car accident, 
they presented no evidence that Sarah's hip injury was the result of anything 
except the accident. 
Appellants' third alleged "fair debate" relates to Sarah's future medical condition or surgery. 
This "question" likewise never appeared until May 2004, and like the others, was concocted after the 
fact and for trial. At trial, Weinsteins and the Appellants' own medical experts presented ample 
evidence for the jury to decide on Sarah's need for futwe medical attention. In any event, Sarah's 
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future medical issue was only one component of her general damages and claim. In May 2004 
Appellants valued Sarah's claim at $75,000.00 and a month later at $1 50,000.00, and at least a year 
before that they knew Sarah's injuries would require surgery and extensive physical therapy, then 
valuing her claim at $25,000.00. Although the final amount of Sarah's general damages was subject 
to fair debate, Appellants cannot use that one component as the basis for delaying payment of other 
general damage components it did not debate. Appellants simply chose to do nothing until Bistline 
provided them the same medical records Appellants long before could have obtained themselves. 
Appellants never investigated or fairly debated these "questions." 
Appellants' fourth alleged "fair debate" is that Weinsteins never presented aproof of loss for 
future medical expenses for Sarah's general damages, and therefore her damages were "inherently 
debatable." Although Sarah's general damages component specific to future medical expenses were 
not independently "proven" or submitted in a formal demand before suit was filed, the information 
was made available, and therefore a sufficient proof of loss was made in accordance with Brinkman, 
supra. Further, as in the case of her "debated" future medical situation, this "debate" was not 
justification for delay of other payment. 
C. Appellants' "mistakes" were not made in good faith. 
Appellants did not make "mistakes" in handling the UM claim. As previously noted, their 
own witnesses testified that in all respects Weinsteins' claim was handled in accordance with 
established company policy. Appellants' conduct was intentional in every respect. They never used 
the medical authorizations, but they now argue that their responsibilities were excused because 
Bistline promised to provide the records after he became involved more than a year after the 
accident. Appellants cannot explain why for the first year they did nothing with the authorizations. 
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The authorization requests clearly implied Appellants would act to investigate and pay the claim. 
Instead, because of company policy, Appellants did nothing to secure any of the medical bills or 
records. Instead, they simply blame Weinsteins and Bistline for delays. 
Appellants' company policy shows there were no "mistakes," innocent or otherwise. Because 
implementing the UM claim company policy constitutes bad faith, any of Appellants' "mistakes" 
pursuing that policy can only have been made in bad faith. At trial Appellants contended that they 
made no mistakes whatsoever, depriving the jury of the opportunity to even address whether they 
were "good faith mistakes." Now Appellants acknowledge possible mistakes, hut contend they were 
simply "honest mistakes" made in good faith. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 
Idaho 173,45 P.3d 829 (2002), reaffirmed the definition of "honest mistake" in Idaho as: 
[a]n innocent mistake which was made despite the presence of procedures to prevent 
the making of such mistake. It is a mistake that occurs despite reasonable care to 
prevent it. A mistake which is the result of negligence or inattention or indifference 
is not an honest mistake." 
Id. at 178 
-
Appellants' own company policy also precluded any procedures to m t  their "mistaken" 
conduct. Their own claims training materials cautioned that such practices would be bad faith in 
states like Idaho, yet in practice, company policy was an intentional process which guaranteed 
perpetration of the mistake. There was no "innocent" mistake 
D. Weinsteins' harm was not fully compensable under eontract damages. 
The fourth required element of bad faith is proof that Weinsteins suffered harm from 
Appellants' conduct which is not fully compensable by contract damages. The undisputed evidence 
showed that Weinsteins were injured and suffered damages not payable under the Policy. Appellants 
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boldly and flippantly assert (at page 19 of their Brief) that the ''W extra-contractual damages 
alleged or evidenced at trial were for Linda Weinstein's "claimed" emotional distress. 
Beginning about four months after the accident Weinsteins were regularly being dunned by 
the medical providers because the accident-related bills were not paid, and Linda told that to the UM 
adjusters. The bill collectors became more and more persistent, to and by mid-2003 they hounded 
Weinsteins daily. These events regularly brought Linda to tears, caused marital discord between 
Leslie and Linda and general disruption in the family. Further, Linda and Sarah also suffered 
humiliation, embarrassment and distress when in front of other patients and medical staff members 
Linda was told that if the bills were not paid Sarah would not receive further treatment. Beyond 
humiliation and embarrassment, Linda and Sarah were understandably upset and stressed by the fear 
that Sarah would not be treated in the future. Although told about all these events, Appellants 
merely cmied on with their UM company policy. Only after more and more contacts and demands 
from Linda, Appellants finally paid some of the bills (some to collection agencies), but only to the 
limit of Med Pay benefits. Still a full year after the accident many of the medical bills remained 
unpaid even though $245,000.00 of UM benefits remained. Even so, Appellants then told 
Weinsteins and their creditors that all insurance benefits were "exhausted." All those facts 
substantiate the severe degree of emotional distress. 
At trial, Appellants shamefully argued that Weinsteins' emotional distress was simply 
'< normal," "usual," "inconvenient," and something anyone should be expected to deal with. 
Although perhaps easy for a company with a $7.9 billion net worth and 2005 annual profits of $584 
million to not comprehend the significance of a few thousand dollars of medical bills not being paid 
and then sent to collection agencies, to the already financially troubled Weinsteins the anxiety, fears, 
and emotional distress was genuine and substantial. There was no reason whatsoever for Appellants 
to be subjected to these stressors. Weinsteins' emotional distress was more than sufficient to 
qualify as compensable outside of the contract. 
Appellants' arguments are wrong, and not in the proper context of a bad faith case. The 
cause of action in this case was bad faith handling of an insurance contract, not an emotional distress 
tort, and because bad faith is a tort, all tort damages can be recovered, including emotional distress. 
In'bad faith cases the emotion distress must be extreme and outrageous. Walston v. Monumental 
Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 21 1, 219, 923 P.2d 456, 465 (1996). 
Because the special relationship between the insured and the insurer, established by White, 
the duty of care and responsibilities for the insurer not to intentionally cause emotional distress to its 
insureds is much higher than in general torts of emotional distress. Generally, where a bad faith 
claim is a tort, mental distress consequential damages can be recovered. AlIan D. Windt, Insurance 
Claims and Disputes: Representation of Insurance Companies and Insureds, 3 6:40 (2007). 
As noted by the trial court Appellants' conduct, Weinsteins' expectations of the contract, and 
what Weinsteins endured "satisfies the requirements of Walston." R. Vol. 11, p. 344. The facts of 
this case made it easy to find Appellants' conduct was extremely outrageous. Weinsteins' harm was 
not fully compensable by contract damages. 
IU. THERE WAS NO ERROR BY THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON 
THE UNFAIR CLAIM SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the Idaho Unfair Claim Settlement Practices 
Act, Idaho Code 3 41-1329. That Act is in fact statutory law in Idaho. Appellants propound an 
incorrect reading of Inland, asserting that the Act can only be used by an expert witness to testify as 
to industry standards. As shown previously, Inland cited violation of the Act as a basis for bad faith. 
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The trial court's Instruction (Instruction No. 37) correctly states that the Act sets forth insurance 
industry standards solely for the jury's determination of punitive damage issues and does not give 
rise to the right to sue. Appellants' UM corporate policy and other conduct violated the Act in 
several respects and has consequences. The jury was properly instructed. 
IV. TKE JURY'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD IS APPROPRIATE AND SHOULD 
NOT BE REVERSED. 
The jury's punitive damages award under the facts and law was entirely appropriate. It was 
error to remit the jury's punitive damage award. Even the remitted amount should not he reduced. 
Appellants' conduct was purposefully calculated and implemented, contrary both to Idaho's case law 
and statutory insurance industry standards. The jury's $6 million punitive damage award was less 
than one one-thousandth (1/1000"') of the Appellants' $7.9 net worth, and slightly more than 
one percent (equivalent to 3.75 &) of Appellants' 2005 $584 million net income. Although the 
jury's punitive damage award was approximately 28 times the $210,000.00 compensatory award it 
was not excessive. 
In her Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Remittitur, Judge Williamson carefully 
and appropriately addressed all the same challenges the Appellants assert to this Court regarding 
punitive damages. Importantly, in conclusion Judge Williamson specifically stated, "the Court 
deems the $6 million punitive damages award to be an appropriate amount in that it adequately 
serves as a deterrent to future bad acts by Defendants and others similarly situated." (See R. Vol. 11, 
p. 303.) Notwithstanding that finding, Judge Williamson erroneously remitted the jury's award 
believing that under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U S .  408, 123 S. Ct., 1513, 
155 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2003) ("Campbell"), she was compelled to reduce punitive damages to an 
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amount within a single digit ratio of the compensatory award. The error of Judge Williamson's 
remittitur is further discussed below. 
The entire punitive damages section of Judge Williamson's Decision and Order on 
Defendants' Motion,for Remittituv contains a concise and complete discussion of the same issues 
argued by Appellants in this appeal. Weinsteins urge this Court to review the same, and particularly 
pages 7-18 thereof. R. Vol. 11, pp. 293-305. 
A. Idaho's July 1,2003, punitive damages cap and higher standard of proof 
do not apply to this case. 
Idaho's statutory provisions on punitive damages changed on July 1,2003. Clearly stated in 
the July 1,2003, amendment the punitive damages cap and standard of proof do not apply to causes 
of action which accrue prior to July I, 2003. Idaho Code § 6-1604,2003 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 122, 
sec. 2, sec. 6. Appellants argue that no cause of action on Weinsteins' UM claim arose until after 
July 1, 2003, in part contending that two specified post-July 1, 2003, events referenced in the 
complaint were exclusive allegations of bad faith rather two of many events of a broad bad faith 
claim for relief based on Appellants entire handling of Weinsteins' claim. A claim for relief need 
only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief. . ." (I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l)), and the compIaint need only state claims upon which relief can be 
granted. Cook v. Skyline Corn., 135 Idaho 26,33, 13 P.3d 857,864 (2000). The key issue in the 
validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims. Vendelin v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,427,95 P.3d 34,35 (2004). Each Weinstein complaint in 
this action met these criteria because they alleged bad faith in handling Weinsteins' claim under the 
Policy, which Policy provided UM benefits. 
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Further, Appellants groundlessly argue that Weinsteins' UM claim could not exist before all 
Med Pay benefits were exhausted. Numerous events before July 1,2003, show otherwise: 
1. Nowhere in the Policy is there any language triggering or otherwise defining 
the commencement of a UM claim; 
2. Appellants' UM claim adjusters opened a UM claim file the very day after 
the accident; 
3. Appellants closed and inactivated Weinsteins' Med Pay claim file in February 
2003, leaving only the UM claim; 
4. Appellants' UM claims department initially valued Sarah's UMclaim within 
days of the accident and increased the value to $25,000.00; 
5. Appellants' UM claim department requested and received from Linda the 
initial medical authorization and provider list in December 2002; 
6. The UM personnel failed to adequately investigate their own UM file; 
7. Sarah endured physical therapy, pain and suffering, surgery (and more 
physical therapy), and missed school; 
8. Appellants refused to pay any of the medical bills (the total of which 
exceeded the Med Pay benefits limit); and 
9. Weinsteins made Appellants' UM adjusters aware of their financial 
hardships, their suffering from the bills not being paid, the need for Sarah's 
surgery, and demand for payment, all of which Appellants ignored. 
In all respects, every element of Weinsteins' UM claim and bad faith cause of action accrued and 
existed long before July 1,2003, and not subject to the new cap. Weinsteins could have maintained 
a lawsuit against the Appellants before July 1,2003, because Appellants' conduct satisfied elements 
of a claim for bad faith. Weinsteins suffered damages. Corbrid~e v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 
Idaho 85,88,730 P.2d 1005,1008 (1986); Western Cow. v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150,158,158 P.3d 
3 13 (Ct. App. 2006). Punitive damages first require prevailing on a successful underlying cause of 
action. Idaho First Nat'l Bankv. Bliss Vallev Foods, 121 Idaho 266,287,824 P.2d 841,862 (1991). 
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Because the underlying bad faith tort cause of action accrued and could have been maintained prior 
to July 1,2003, so did Weinsteins' entitlement to punitive damages, and it is controlled by the prior 
version of Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
Appellants' bad faith began at least as early as December 2002 (when they failed to use the 
authorization and provider list from Linda to investigate and evaluate Weinsteins' claim) and no later 
than February 2003 when Appellants closed and inactivated their Med Pay claim file before g n ~  bills 
had been paid. Appellants' bad faith continued at least two more years, until they finally paid an 
undisputed $80,000.00 for Sarah's general damages (questionable amount given Appellants' own 
$1 50,000.00 claim value). The cumulative effect of a continuing chain of tortuous activity is what 
makes an actionable continuing tort. w, 123 Idaho at 616, 850 P.2d at 767. Further, an 
allocation of damages across the span of the acts is impractical. w, 253 F.3d at 318-19. The 
accrual of the cause of action "reaches back" to its beginning even if the beginning of a tort "lies 
outside the statutory limitations period when it would be unreasonable to require or even permit him 
to sue separately over every incident of a defendant's unlawful conduct." McCabe v. Craven, 145 
Idaho 954 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Heard v. Sheehan, 253 F.3d 316,319 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
B. There was no error in refusing to instruct the jury that Weinsteins had 
to prove corporate ratification. 
Appellants argue there was no proof of an officer or director reviewing or ratifying their 
conduct, and that the jury should have been instructed that punitive damages could not be awarded 
against the Appellants without such authorization. Although Appellants untimely requested a jury 
instruction (which the trial court refused) such an instruction was immaterial, unnecessary, and 
contrary to Appellants' uncontroverted fundamental defense confirmed by their adjuster and 
management testimony that their actions conformed to the longstanding company policy. 
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Even absent that defense, Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 830 
P.2d 1185 (l992), cited by Appellants, is clearly distinguishable. In Manning the defendant's 
fundamental defense was that the wrongful acts were unauthorized and the directors and officers did 
not participate in, or authorize or ratify them. In this case, Appellants steadfastly defend their UM 
payment conduct of one final payment as "company policy." They cannot now assert otherwise. 
Specifically discussing corporate liability for punitive damages based on the acts of its agents, this 
Court Found that establishing employee training procedures adequate to prevent wrongful acts 
"ultimately is the responsibility of .  . . corporate management," particularly when the agent's deviant 
action was a regular occurrence. Vendelin, 140 Idaho at 431. Here Appellants admitted that 
Weinsteins' UM claim was handled the way adjusters are trained to handle UM claims. Tr. p. 5 12. 
C. The trial court did not err in refusing to set aside the punitive damage 
award because of lack of evidence of unconscionable conduct. 
The trial evidence showed the overwhelming extent of Appellants' misconduct and degree of 
unconscionability under any standard of punitive damages. 
Appellants' "first impression" argument on a UM insurer's obligation to pay undisputed 
portions of a claim in advance of a final settlement, was shown above as contrary to Idaho's settled' 
law. Appellants' company policy is contrary to law and industry standards and in direct conflict with 
the duties and expectations of first-party insurance in general. Appellants' company policy existed 
only for Appellants' own financial interests while knowingly disregarding Weinsteins' interest and 
well being. As such, that company policy can only be categorized as outrageous and oppressive. 
Appellants' conduct was also fraudulent in several respects. For example, more than a year 
after the accident Appellants told unpaid creditors that Weinsteins' policy benefits were 
"exhausted" when in fact there was at least $245,000.00 of UM coverage remaining. The 
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consequences thereof could only be creditor pressure on Weinsteins. Appellants also repeatedly 
represented to Weinsteins medical authorizations and provider lists were required to investigate and 
evaluate the claim, yet Appellants did nothing after Weinsteins provided those materials numerous 
times. 
With a straight face Appellants also contend their $1 0,000.00 advance payment plan was "a 
good faith determination based on their reasonable questions regarding Sarah Weinstein's possible 
preconditions and the severity of her hip injury." Appellants' Brief r/ 2, p. 27. The outrageous and 
oppressive bad faith of that act, however, is clear: this paltry offer came only after Appellants' very 
first review of Sarah's medical records, and more than a year and a half after the accident; and, the 
adjusters then valued the undisputed claim as high as $150,000.00; and, Appellants were aware of 
Weinsteins' financial hardship. Given those facts, even if Appellants had no ulterior statute of 
limitations motive as previously argued, the advance payment offer was clearly outrageous and 
financially oppressive. 
D. The court did not err in allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint 
to state a claim for punitive damages. 
The trial court has broad discretion in allowing amendments to the pleadings. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in allowing Weinsteins to assert a claim for punitive damages. Following 
a hearing the court determined there was sufficient proof that Weinsteins could adequately show 
Appellants' oppressive, outrageous conduct. Appellants had ample opportunity to conduct discovery 
and prepare their defenses after the amendment was allowed. In any event, Appellants' arguments 
are moot in view of the jury's verdict after being properly instructed. See Vendelin 140 Idaho at 424. 
Appellants have shown no abuse of discretion. 
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E. Punitive damages as awarded and as remitted do not violate due process. 
Neither the jury's punitive damage award, nor the remitted punitive damages were excessive 
in this case. 
1. The punitive damages in this case were constitutionally proven; 
2. The court did not err by failing to reduce punitive damages to less than 
or equal to consequential damages; and 
3. The court erred in remitting the punitive damages, whether or not as a 
condition of denying Appellants' Motion for New Trial. 
Because of the overlap and interrelation of these constitutional punitive damage issues, 
Weinsteins will address them collectively in this section, as to both the appeal and the cross-appeal 
before the Court. 
Defendants have picked and chosen (largely out of context) language primarily from the three 
most recent United States Supreme Court cases addressing punitive damages, Williams v. Phillip 
Morris USA, 549 U.S. 346, 127 S. Ct. 1057,166 L. Ed. 2d 940 (2007) ("Phillip Morris"), BMW of 
N. Am., lnc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996) ("Gore"), and 
Campbell, supra. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also recently addressed these issues in Myers v. Workmen's 
Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 95 P.3d 977 (2004) ("Workmen's"), and Hall v. Farmers Alliance 
Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313,179 P.3d 276 (2008) ("Hall"), bothdecidedafter Gore and Campbell. 
Hall was decided after the "first," but before the "second," (and final) U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
in Phillip Morris (the U.S. Supreme Court revisited Phillip Morris in 2009, a second time, allowing 
a punitive damageslgeneral damages ratio of nearly 100:l (97:l actually) to ultimately stand). 
556 U.S. - (2009). 
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Both Workmen's and Hall are very instructive, particularly regarding the purposes and 
objectives of punitive damages, the relevant factors in reviewing the amount of punitive damages 
awards when a new trial is requested, the proportionality and relationship of punitive damages to 
actual damages, the wrongdoer's conduct, the constitutionality of punitive damages (including the 
amounts and ratios thereof), all in light of Gore and Campbell. 
The first Phillip iZlorris U.S. Supreme Court decision (549 U.S. at 346) prohibited punitive 
damages for injury to non-parties. That is a non-issue in this case because the jury was instructed 
consistent with the first Phillip Morris decision. The second, final decision in Phillip Morris (556 
U.S. - (2009)) addressed other issues but did not overturn a punitive damage award some 97 
times compensatory damages on due process grounds (that ratio is more than three times the ratio in 
this case). 
The Workmen 's jury awarded punitive damages amounting to one percent of the defendants' 
total net worth, 408 times more than the actual damages. The Hall ratio was approximately 35:l. 
The $6 million punitive damages award in this case was only 0.00076 of Appellant Liberty 
Mutual's $7.9 billion net worth (28.57 times actual damages) and slightly more than one percent of 
Appellant Liberty Mutual's $584 million 2005 net income. $584 million net income amounts to $1.6 
million per day, 365 days per year, making $6 million less than four days of Appellant's net income. 
The verdict was rendered 1,826 days after the plaintiffs' accident; $6 million is only two-tenths of 
one percent (0.002%) of Appellant Liberty Mutual's 2005-based income during that period. 
The 2007 Hall decision makes essentially the same constitutional analysis as Workmen's, 
based on the same U.S. Supreme Court cases except Phillip Morris. However, the facts in Hall are 
extremely different than those in this case, particularly as to reprehensibility, damages, and general 
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degree of bad faith. The insurer's conduct in Hall was very benign in comparison to the Appellants' 
conduct in this case. Because the facts and culpability in Workmen's more closely parallel the facts 
in this case, Workmen 's is a better illustration of why the punitive damages awarded (by both the jury 
and the court on remittitur) do not violate due process. 
Specifically addressing the constitutionality of punitive damages, Workmen's stated: 
In BMW, the United States Supreme Court identified three 'guideposts' for assessing 
whether a punitive damage award is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio of the punitive damages to 
the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff; (3) the relationship between the punitive 
damages and the statutorily prescribed civil or criminal penalty for comparable 
misconduct. Workmen's Auto argues that the jury's award of $300,000 in punitive 
damages is so excessive as to violate due process, relying upon the United States 
Supreme Court's recent decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 155 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2003). In Campbell the Supreme 
Court reiterated its concern with allowing juries to base their awards g&& upon the 
wealth of the defendant and reaffirmed the use of the three guideposts discussed in 
BMWas the proper analysis to determine the constitutionality of an award of punitive 
damages. 
Workmen's Auto claims that reprehensibility is not determined merely by the 
defendant's bad motive, contending that the Court in Campbell required that the 
following factors also be considered: (1) whether the harm caused was physical as 
opposed to economic; (2) whether the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or 
a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (3) the target of the conduct 
was financially vulnerable; (4) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
isolated incident; and (5) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery or 
deceit, or was mere accident. 
Giving due consideration to the concerns of the United States Supreme Court, the 
award in this case does not offend due process. 
Idaho has a legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from the conduct displayed by 
Workmen's Auto. Workmen's Auto consciously violated the hndamental 
obligations to defend against claims and pay damages incurred by its insured. It 
offered evidence that such conduct was not deviation from reasonable standards of 
conduct, indicating that as an institution it does not understand or recognize its 
obligations. The level of reprehensibility in this case is high: 
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The jury award of $300,000 represents 1% of the total worth of Workmen's Auto. 
To the extent that punitive damages have a legitimate role in preventing future 
- - 
wrongful conduct, this amount represents a relatively srnall pan oillie value o&c 
c.ompanv. 11 sienificantly smaller amount would likclv be ineffective in deterring 
future wrongful conduct. 
Comparing the punitive damage award to other civil penalties that might be incurred 
pursuant to Idaho's Trade Practices and Frauds Act is not as persuasive as 
Workmen's Auto suggests. Apparently the existence of that Act did not influence the 
company. Even the threat of losing licensure in the State did not have an immediate 
effect upon Workmen's Auto. 
Workmen's, 140 Idaho at 509-10. (Emphasis added.) 
Also in Workmen's, the Court noted specific Campbell "reprehensibility factors" which 
also exist in this case: (i) the Weinsteins were very financially vulnerable, like the plaintiff in 
Workmen's; (ii) both insurers refused to pay anything until all claims were finally settled, reflecting 
their corporate policy; (iii) the insurers' actions were intentional. Weinsteins concede that the 
insurer's conduct in Workmen S was more reprehensible than Appellants in this case, but certainly 
not ten times more reprehensible (as was the punitive damage ratio). 
Other language of the Workmen's case, although not set forth in the specific 
"constitutionality" discussion on pages 509 and 5 10, is enlightening: 
. . . an assessment of punitive damages takes away the incentive for engaging in bad 
conduct by making such conduct unprofitable. (At 506, citing Harwood v. Talbert, 
136 Idaho 672 (2001)). 
Proportionality is a to be considered in evaluating whether a punitive damage 
award is excessive. (At 506, citing Edmark Motors v. Twin Cities Toyota, Inc., 11 1 
Idaho 846,851 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
However, the court must also consider 'the prospective deterrent effect of such an 
award upon persons situated similarly to the defendant, the motives actuating the 
defendant's conduct, the degree of calculation involved in the defendant's conduct, 
and the extent of the defendant's disregard of the rights of others.' (At 506, citing 
Boise Dodge, Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902,908 (1969)). 
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Much of the argument asserted by Workmen's Auto relates to the disproportionate 
ratio between the jury's award of punitive damages and its award of nominal 
damages. However, this Court has repeatedly refused to review awards of punitive 
damages based on any particular mathematical formula. In light of the overall 
circumstances of this case, the award is appropriate to serve the Duruose of deterring 
future similar conduct by Workmen's Auto, as well as other insurers. The district 
I 
court's denial of the motion for a new trial as to the punitive damages assessed 
against Workmen's Auto is affirmed. 
1 Workmen's, 140 Idaho at 507-08. (Emphasis added.) 
I Applying Workmen's (a "nominal" damages case, but upholding a 300:l ratio) and 
I 
comparing the low reprehensibility of defendant's conduct in Hall, (upholding a 4:l ratio)the 
1 punitive damage award in this case is not unconstitutional and provides the Appellants and 
i 
1 others similarly situated in Idaho with an economic incentive to change bow they do business with 
economically vulnerable people they agree to protect. A lesser award will not serve that purpose. 1 
1 As noted in both Workmen's and Hall, the most important B M  due process guideline is 
1 reprehensibility. Again, Appellants' reprehensibility in this case is extreme, as it was in Workmen S. 
i 
As in Workmen's, Weinsteins' claim was treated the same as a third-party claim, all the while 
knowing but disregarding the actual and potential consequences to Weinsteins. Appellants persist in 
1 arguing that the law pertaining to their obligation to pay in a UM case is a "novel" issue of "first 
impression." The unsettled law is obviously not clear enough to them, so without a $6 million 
! 
punitive damages award to pay, they will continue to be undeterred. Simply ignoring Weinsteins 
I (who not surprisingly were in a crisis, physically and financially injured) by failing to act or 
! investigate for a year and a half, causing severe emotional distress, and forcing them to wait years 
before payment shows nothing but a conscious and reckless disregard for their insureds' health and 
1 
safety. Those same factors make it appropriate and in Idaho's interest to punish Appellants for their 
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outrageous, oppressive and illegal conduct and deter them and other Idaho insurers from treating 
their UM insureds this way. 
As in Workmen's, here neither the law nor regulatory penalties influenced or deterred 
Appellants' conduct, therefore satisfying the third Gore guidepost (comparison to penalty or fine). 
This case, Workmen 's and Hall are clear examples that many insurance companies are undeterred by 
Idaho's statutorily prescribed civil and criminal penalties. Reinstating the jury's $6 million punitive 
damage award will provide the deterrence their disregard for other potential penalties did not 
provide. 
Only because the trial court felt jury's award was outside the limits of Campbell did it feel 
compelled to remit the award it to a single digit (9:l) ratio of the compensatory award. R. 303. 
The second Gore due process guidepost is proportionality, the ratio of punitive and 
compensatory damages. Appellants even argue that the ratio should be 1 : 1 or lower, citing several 
decisions after Campbell. However, none of Appellants' cited cases are sufficiently similar to this 
case. As an example, Exxon Shipuing. Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2605,171 L. Ed. 2d 
570 (2008) did not involve intentional conduct, and it was specifically differentiated as a maritime 
case (see Supreme Court of the United States Opinion No. 07-219, p. 28). 
Appellants argue that the trial court felt the awarded  unitive damages were excessive, but 
that is simply false. The court stated: 
The Court deems the $6 million punitive damages award to be an ap~rooriate 
m, in that it adequately serves as a deterrent to future bad acts by Defendants 
and others similarly situated. The amount, while large to many individuals, is a tiny 
fraction of Defendants' assets but enough to secure their attention. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 303 (emphasis added). 
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Neither Gore nor Campbell drew a line to establish a single-digit ratio limit. Instead, 
Campbell specifically acknowledges that in some cases a higher ratio will not violate due process. 
Gore acknowledged that the strength of its first and third "guideposts" would affect the second 
"proportionality" guidepost. After Gore and Campbell, both Workmen's and Hall reaffirmed the 
prospective deterrent need and the effect of a punitive damages award on others situated similarly to 
the insurers. Workmen S allowed punitive damages 408 times compensatory damages to stand. 
Workmen S at 506. Although acknowledging that there is no bright-line rule for the ratio of punitive 
to compensatory damages, the trial court in this case accepted Appellants' argument that Campbell 
limits the ratio to a maximum of 9:l. R. Vol. 11, p. 303. By ordering such a remittitur conditioned 
on denying Appellants' Motion for New Trial, the trial court erred by holding that Campbell limits 
the ratio to 9: 1. Campbell did not draw a 9: 1 ratio bright line to satisfy due process, clearly shown 
by the second and final result of Phillip Morris, where the U.S. Supreme Court did let stand a ratio 
close to 100: 1. Although that second Phillig Morris decision denied certiorari on a case upheld by 
the Oregon Supreme Court on a procedural ground, the resulting hugely disproportionate amount of 
punitive damages is the due process "elephant in the room" that cannot simply be ignored or 
dismissed as a procedural technicality. The holdings of the Idaho and U.S. Supreme Courts do not 
dictate that either punitive damage award in this case is constitutionally excessive. The Court's 
remittitur and conditional granting of a new trial was therefore erroneous. 
V. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS APPROPRIATE 
To be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the insured must first provide a proof of loss as 
required by the insurance policy, and the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within thirty 
(30) days of receipt of the proof of loss. Idaho Code 3 41-1 839(1), Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw 
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Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743,747, 152 P.3d 614 (2007). Here, the Policy did not define, and Appellants 
did not require, any specific form of proof of loss, and therefore Weinsteins needed only provide 
Appellants sufficient information to investigate the loss. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 349-50. 
Weinsteins provided such information to Appellants beginning December 2002, enabling Appellants 
to investigate Weinsteins' medical bills and Sarah's general damages. Appellants refused to pay all 
of Weinsteins' medical expenses until after suit was filed nearly two years after the accident, and 
Appellants paid a of Sarah's general damages more than two years after the accident, even 
though they had full notice of the seriousness of Sarah's injuries and internally valued Sarah's 
general damages as high as $150,000.00. Those facts and Appellants' company policy showthat the 
only way Weinsteins would secure the amounts justly due was to file suit. 
VI. THERE WAS NO JUROR MISCONDUCT, AND THEREFORE NO ERROR IN NOT 
GRANTING A NEW TRIAL. 
During voir dire the Court asked jurors if any were insured by the Appellants. Some jurors 
raised their hands and were excused, but Mr. Barbo did not raise his hand. After the jury was sworn, 
Mr. Barho ascertained he was insured by Appellant Liberty Mutual (R. Vol. 11, pp. 256-57), but he 
was unaware of that fact during voir dire. R. Voi. 11, pp. 259-60. 
Mr. Barbo's answer during voir dire was honest, but mistakenly incorrect. It was not 
intentionally false as must be shown for a new trial under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 555-56,104 S. Ct. 845,78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984). In line with that U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling, Idaho has also ruled that in order to obtain a new trial the moving party must 
show that a dishonest response, rather than a simply mistaken response, was given during voir dire. 
State v. Reutzel, 130 Idaho 88,96,936 P.2d 1330 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 
828 P.2d 1304 (1992); Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192,75 P.3d 1202 (2003). The 
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post-trial testimony of Mr. Barbo shows that Mr. Barbo's response was simply mistaken, not 
intentionally dishonest, and therefore Appellants did not satisfy their burden of proof of juror 
misconduct. 
This issue is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. As noted by the United States 
Supreme Court in McDonough, and recognized by the Idaho courts in Tolman and Reutzel: 
To invalidate the results of a three-week trial because of a juror's mistaken, though 
honest, response to a question, is to insist on something closer to perfection than our 
judicial system can be expected to give. 
464 U.S. at 555-56, 104 S. Ct. at 850 
The trial court's factual findings concerning Mr. Barbo's testimony during the post-trial 
hearing on this issue are significant. R. Vol. 11, pp. 259-61. Even though the trial court did not 
specifically inquire if any prospective jurors were policyholders of Appellants and instead merely 
asked if any of them knew the parties, Mr. Barbo in fact did not know the Appellants and did not 
even realize he was a policyholder until later, so his lack of response to the trial court's question was 
therefore honest. R. Vol. II., p. 259. The trial court further noted that although Mr. Barbo had made 
a policy claim against Appellant Liberty Mutual nearly three years before trial, he was satisfied with 
the outcome and held no grudges or biases, in fact remaining insured with Appellant Liberty Mutual 
at the time of trial, further evidencing his honest mistake. Tr. p. 260. Additionally, during voir dire 
Mr. Barbo expressed a strong desire not to be a juror and asked the court to excuse him for work 
duties. The court correctly determined that since Mr. Barbo was still a Liberty Mutual-insured, any 
implied prejudice of Mr. Barbo would be against Weinsteins rather than against his own insurance 
company. Tr. p. 260, Finally, the trial court correctly found that even if Mr. Barbo's omission in 
voir dire was an honest mistake, it did not regard a material matter giving rise to challenge for 
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cause because the mere insurer-insured relationship does not constitute "united in business." 
Tr. p. 260. The trial court did not e n  in refusing to grant a new trial for juror misconduct. 
VII. THERE WAS NO ERROR NOT GRANTING A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE OF 
ANNOTATED EXHIBIT LISTS PROVIDED TO THE JURY. 
Appellants did not object to the exhibit notebooks with the annotated exhibit lists when 
offered and admitted. Tr. p. 407; R. Vol. II., p. 306. Later when the court and both parties agreed to 
remove the lists from the juror notebooks, only the list from an alternate juror's notebook contained 
any writings or markings. R. Vol. IT., pp. 306-07. In any event, the specific annotation comments 
Appellants took issue with were conclusively proven by the testimony of Appellants' own witnesses. 
R. Vol. II., p. 306. When removed from the juror notebooks and collected by the court, the jurors 
were specifically instructed to disregard the lists. R. Vol. II., p. 306. Based on thosefacts, there was 
no error in not ordering a mistrial or subsequently not granting a new trial. 
VIII. WEINSTEINS' DAMAGES WERE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND NOT 
EXCESSIVE. 
Addressing Sarah's general damages, for some reason Appellants focus only on Sarah's 
admittedly unsure future medical needs, disregarding the clear evidence of Sarah's other damages 
(such as past and future pain and suffering) compromised her lifestyle and likelihood of developing 
early arthritis. Appellants presented their own evidence and argument addressing all of Sarah's 
general damages, and the jury found the amount thereof to be $250,000.00. Ruling on Appellants' 
post-trial motions, the trial court determined those damages were similar to what the Court would 
have awarded. R. Vol. II., p. 3 1 1. 
As discussed earlier, the evidence also fully substantiated the jury's $210,000.00 
compensatory award to Weinsteins. Appellants had full opportunity to contradict Weinsteins' 
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evidence, but the jury found for Weinsteins. The trial court also determined that those damages were 
similar to what the Court would have set. R. Vol. IL, p. 312. 
As previously briefed herein, the $6 million punitive damage award was fully substantiated 
by the evidence, and specifically deemed "appropriate" by the trial court. No damages are excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants' appeal should be denied on all issues raised and the trial court's remittitur of 
punitive damages, conditional or not, should be set aside. 
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